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The Case for Domestic Box Office Receipt
Derivatives
Jeremy A. Gogel*
INTRODUCTION
Derivatives have been given a bad rap over the last two
years. Following the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing
economic collapse of 2008, many commentators and political
figures targeted derivatives as one of the main causes of the
financial crisis.1 Derivatives were immediately branded as
“risky,” “complex,” and “impossible to understand,” and were
even analogized to gambling.2 Indeed, derivatives are risky
instruments if used carelessly, but if used properly, they provide
a useful hedging device. These instruments have been traded onexchange and over-the-counter in the United States for nearly as
long as the country has existed, and have traded in other
countries for millennia.3
While the basic principles of these contracts have largely
remained the same over time, the types of underlying assets,
indices, or rates from which derivatives derive their value have
expanded. Derivatives were originally used by farmers,
processors, and end users of agricultural products to hedge
against the risk of abrupt swings in the price of crops, but
eventually began to be used to hedge against interest rate
swings, credit risk, currency prices, weather changes, and even

* Associate at the law firm of Baker, Sterchi, Cowden, and Rice in St. Louis,
Missouri. Previously, Mr. Gogel served as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Philip M.
Frazier of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Prior to
his clerkship, Mr. Gogel interned at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
Division of Enforcement and the Office of the Missouri Secretary of State’s Securities
Division, and volunteered at the Office of the Missouri Attorney General’s Consumer
Protection Division. Mr. Gogel received a J.D. and M.B.A. from the University of
Missouri-Columbia in May, 2009, and dual B.S.B.A.s in Finance & Banking and
Economics from the same institution in May, 2006. While earning his law and graduate
business degrees, Mr. Gogel taught an undergraduate course in Corporate Finance at the
University of Missouri-Columbia.
1 See Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help
Avoid Future Financial Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 217, 220 (2009).
2 See, e.g., id. at 232–37.
3 Id. at 233.
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death.4 Despite their wide ranging use, Congress, in response to
the 2008 financial crisis, sought to strengthen the existing
derivative regulations, and in doing so banned trading of
derivatives tied to box office receipt numbers.5
At the time Congress passed this legislation, there had never
been any exchange trading of box office derivatives, and little to
no over-the-counter trading of box office derivatives.6 Despite the
lack of contribution by these instruments to the financial crisis,
Congress nonetheless took the request by two recently created
box office derivatives exchanges to begin listing and trading
contracts as further evidence of the excesses and reckless
behavior of the financial sector.7
By banning box office
derivatives, Congress halted an opportunity to bring additional
financing to the movie industry and potentially stifled future
creativity in the derivative markets.8 Additionally, the ban on
box office receipt derivatives marks the first time in nearly thirty
years that Congress has prohibited trading of a derivative
instrument for a specific underlying asset, and only the third
time in U.S. history that it banned trading of derivatives for a
specific commodity.9 After passage of the new regulations, the
only two commodities on which derivatives cannot be traded in
the United States are onions and box office receipts.10
This Article will discuss the origin and regulation of
derivatives, the purpose behind the creation of box office
derivative exchanges, and why Congress banned the trading of
box office derivatives. The Article will conclude with a discussion
of why Congress’ decision to ban box office derivatives has the
potential to hurt the movie industry, as well as future financial
innovation in general.
4 Don M. Chance, A Brief History of Derivatives, in ESSAYS IN DERIVATIVES 16, 17–
19 (1998).
5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 721(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1659 (2010).
6 See Todd Shields & Michael White, Box-Office Futures Market Wins U.S.
Approval, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0420/cantor-wins-cftc-s-approval-for-movie-futures-market-opposed-by-hollywood.html.
7 Letter from Tom Ashton, CEO, Vantage Advisor Group, LLC, to Andrew Wing,
Pres.
&
CEO,
Cantor
Entertainment
(Apr.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cantorexchange.com/getdoc/6bc630b2-33e0-4eb0-9ee2-4e20c1d5bc79/VantageAdvisors-Letter-on-Box-Office-Futures.aspx.
8 Letter from Michael Burns, CEO, Lionsgate, to H.R. Comm. on Agriculture
(Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.cantorexchange.com/getdoc/bb0c85fe-0cf1-434c8444-b3e2c02866ea/Lionsgate-Burns-Letter-to-House-Committee-on-Agric.aspx.
9 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Address at the Financial
Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia: Government
Regulation and Derivative Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Greenspan, Government
Regulation and Derivative Contracts], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/Speeches/1997/19970221.htm.
10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 721(a)(4).
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES
A. What are Derivatives?
A derivative is a “financial instrument whose value depends
on or is derived from the performance of a secondary source such
as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity.”11 There is no
singular type of derivative instrument, but rather, a family of
instruments who derive their values from reference points.12
These reference points can be currency exchange rates, interest
rates set by financial institutions, prices of securities such as
stocks or bonds, prices of physical commodities such as precious
metals or harvested farm products, weather patterns,13 and even
mortality dates.14
The most common derivative instruments are forward and
futures contracts, swaps, and options, with each having distinct
payment and/or delivery terms.15 Futures and options are used
for hedging (i.e., shifting the risk of price changes to those who
are more willing or able to assume this risk), or for speculation
(i.e., investing with the intent of profiting from price changes).16
Swaps and forwards are “typically used to hedge or to obtain
more desirable financing.”17 Swaps can be used to speculate, but
are generally not used as frequently for this purpose because of
the relatively high transaction costs compared to those of other
derivatives.18 Thus, only participants willing to operate on a

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (9th ed. 2005).
See Samuel, supra note 1, at 233.
Various weather derivative products are traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. These products typically derive their values from fluctuations in temperatures.
For an overview, see J. SCOTT MATHEWS, CME GROUP, WEATHER PRODUCTS: DOG DAYS
AND
DEGREE
DAYS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cmegroup.com/
trading/weather/files/WT133_Weather_White_Paper_Final.pdf; Bob Dischel, Weather
Risk Management at the ‘Frozen Falls Fuel Company,’ CME GROUP,
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/WEA_weather_risk.pdf
(last
visited
Nov. 3, 2010).
14 Cris Sholto Heaton, Have Financial Wizards Found a Way to Outwit Death?,
MONEYWEEK (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/have-financialwizards-found-a-way-to-outwit-death.aspx.
15 See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 26 (1994)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES], available at http://archive.gao.gov/
t2pbat3/151647.pdf. More complex derivatives can be created by combining the elements
of basic derivatives. For example, a swaption gives the holder the option, but not the
obligation, to enter into a swap on or before a specified future date. An interest rate cap
(or floor) agreement is a derivative in which the buyer receives payments at the end of
each period in which the interest rate exceeds (or is below) the specified reference rate.
See id. at 172.
16 Id. at 25.
17 Id. at 26.
18 Id.
11
12
13
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large scale have the potential to make swap speculation
worthwhile.
Forward and futures contracts are similar, except that a
forward contract is negotiated, settled, and cleared privately
between two parties, while a futures contract is entered into on
an exchange, settled, and cleared by a central clearing party
(CCP).19 An individual who buys a forward or futures contract
assumes what is known as a “long” position.20 The seller of a
forward or futures contract assumes what is known as a “short”
position.21 The two parties, by taking these positions, assume the
respective obligation to buy and sell the underlying asset at a
specific price sometime in the future.22 The holder of a long
position benefits when the price of the underlying asset
increases, while the holder of a short position benefits when the
price of the underlying asset decreases.23 A party to a futures
contract has two choices on how to liquidate its position. The
first option is to liquidate the position prior to the settlement
date.24 This option requires the party to take an offsetting
position in the same contract.25 For the buyer of a futures
contract, “this means selling the same number of identical
futures contracts; for the seller of a futures contract, this means
buying the same number of identical futures contracts.”26
Alternatively, a party can wait until the contract settlement
date.27 Then, “the party purchasing a futures contract accepts
delivery” of the underlying asset, or settlement is made in cash.28

19 Clearance is the process of acquiring trade data, comparing buyer and seller
versions of the data, and guaranteeing that the trade will settle once the data is matched.
Settlement is the process of determining the daily closing price for each contract and
collecting losses from clearing members carrying losing positions and making payments to
clearing members carrying gaining positions. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C.
EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 827–28 (12th ed. 2008).
20 Frequently
Asked Questions About
Futures
Trading, GOWEBTRADE,
http://www.gowebtrade.com/ztrading-products/futures (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
21 Id.
22 BRIGHAM & EHRHARDT, supra note 19, at 827.
23 For instance, imagine that Party A bought a futures contract from Party B,
whereby Party A would purchase 100 barrels of crude oil from Party B for $100 per barrel
in one year. If, in one year, the price of crude oil is selling for $125 per barrel, Party A
would be the “winner” because he is saving $25 per barrel. Party B, on the other hand,
would be the “loser” because he is selling his oil at a $25 per barrel discount. Of course,
the opposite would be true if the price of oil were selling for $75 per barrel in one year. See
GARY SHOUP, CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR FINANCIAL MANAGERS,
BROKERS, AND THEIR CONSULTANTS 75 (1998).
24 PETER K NEVITT & FRANK J. FABOZZI, PROJECT FINANCING 230 (7th ed. 2000)
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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Because forward contracts are privately negotiated, it is up to the
parties to determine how the positions can be liquidated.29
Option contracts give the purchaser the right to buy (call
option) or sell (put option) a specified asset at a particular price
(exercise price) on or before a certain future date.30 In exchange
for the right to buy or sell the particular asset, the purchaser
pays the seller (writer) a certain amount (option premium).31
Options are different from forwards and futures in that they do
not create an obligation on the part of the purchaser to buy or
sell the underlying asset.32 Options that expire without being
exercised do so with no value. Thus, a purchaser of an option
would only lose his option premium if he decides not to exercise
the option.33 Options, like futures, may be exchange-traded, or,
like forwards, may be privately negotiated.34 Additionally, the
buyer of an option assumes a long position, while the writer of an
option assumes a short position.35
A swap transaction is similar to a forward or futures
contract, except that it has a multiple period structure with
corresponding multiple payments.36 For instance, in a fixed-forfloating interest rate swap:
[O]ne party agrees to pay an amount equal to a stated fixed interest
rate applied to a notional amount, and the other party agrees to pay
an amount determined by reference to the value of a specified floating
interest rate (e.g., LIBOR) for the applicable period as applied to the
same notional amount.37

The number of periods for which the swap applies to is
predetermined by the parties.38 In addition to fixed-for-floating
Id.
See GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 27.
Id.
Id.
For instance, imagine that Party A owns one share of stock in XYZ, Corp. Party A
decides to sell Party B the right to buy this share for $45 within the next six months. The
premium on this call option is $5. As soon as the price of XYZ’s stock exceeds $50,
Party A would exercise his option, and purchase the stock, because at that point, the sum
of the exercise price and option premium is less than the price of the stock. Depending on
the terms of the option contract, there may be a transfer of ownership of the stock from
the option writer to the option buyer, or the option writer may merely pay the option
purchaser the difference between the sum of the exercise price and option premium, and
the market price of the stock at the time the option is exercised. If the price of XYZ’s
stock drops, however, Party A would simply let the option expire, and simply pay (if he
had not done so already) Party B the option premium. See id.
34 Id. at 26–27.
35 See NEVITT & FABOZZI, supra note 24, at 245.
36 Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as
Collateral, 57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1131 (2002).
37 Id.
38 For instance, imagine that Party A owns a bond with a $1,000 par value paying a
fixed interest rate of 5% compounded annually. If Party B owns a similar bond paying a
29
30
31
32
33
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swaps, parties can enter into fixed-for-fixed swaps, floating-forfloating swaps, or any combination they desire.39 Parties can
also enter into swap transactions where the occurrence of a
particular event (e.g., default on mortgage payments) would
require clearance and settlement between the parties.40 Other
similar transactions include currency and commodity swaps.
Historically, swaps have been entered into privately between the
parties because of their unique nature; however, recent
legislation has created a presumption that these types of
contracts will be cleared through a CCP going forward.41 Swaps
enjoy higher transactions costs than exchange-traded derivatives
due to their unique nature, which sometimes require extensive
negotiations between the parties.42
B. How Are Derivatives Regulated?
As noted above, derivatives fall into two main categories.
One category consists of standardized, exchange-traded
instruments, while the other category consists of customized,
privately negotiated instruments known as over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives.43 Although many derivative contracts have
historically been exchange-traded, the number of OTC
derivatives far outnumbers the size of the exchange-traded
contracts market.44 These contracts differ in the ways they are
regulated.
floating interest rate tied to the LIBOR, Party B may want to hedge against the risk of
the interest rate plummeting, and simultaneously guarantee a known, steady stream of
income. Party A, on the other hand, may want to trade the guaranteed interest payments
for the possibility of larger interest payments. Thus, if the two parties enter into an
interest rate swap transaction, when the interest is paid on the two bonds, any interest
payments above $50 would have to be paid from Party B to Party A. Conversely, if
Party B received less than $50 in interest at the end of the year, Party A would have to
pay Party B the difference between what he was actually paid, and the $50. Note that
Party B will never receive more or less than $50 in this transaction, but that Party A has
the potential to earn more than $50, as well as the potential to earn less than $50. It
should also be clear that ownership of the underlying instruments—in this case, the
bonds—never switches hands. See Samuel, supra note 1, at 237.
39 Id.
40 Kathryn M. Trkla, Implications of the Financial Reform Legislation for Derivatives
Activities, LEGAL NEWS ALERT, July 2010, at 2, available at http://www.foley.com/
abc.aspx?Publication=7351.
41 See infra Part I.B.1.ii.
42 Patrick Casabona, Derivatives, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE
235, 237 (Burton S. Kaliski ed., 2001).
43 Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASS’N, INC., http://www.isda.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
44 Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0911.htm. The Bank of International
Settlements estimates that the total notional amount of outstanding OTC contracts at the
end of June 2009 was $605 trillion. Id. This amount is contrasted with the GAO’s
estimate of the notional amount of all outstanding derivatives contracts (including
exchange traded contracts) at the end of the 1992 fiscal year which was $12.1 trillion. See
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1. Exchange-Traded Derivatives Regulation
Exchange-traded derivatives are primarily regulated by two
federal government agencies—the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).45
i. CFTC Regulation
U.S. derivatives regulation began during the Civil War when
Congress passed the Anti-Gold Futures Act.46 The Act was
passed in response to the significant discount at which the
Union’s “fiat currency”—known as the greenbacks—was trading
in comparison to gold.47 The Act made it unlawful to enter into
any contract for the purchase of gold coin, gold bullion, or foreign
exchange to be delivered on any day after the making of such a
contract.48 Unfortunately, instead of stabilizing the price of the
greenbacks, Congress’ attempt at regulating gold and foreign
currency futures led to the further decline in the value of the
greenbacks.49 As a result, Congress repealed the Act only two
weeks after it was enacted.50
Between the years of 1880 and 1920, Congress introduced
approximately two hundred bills that would regulate futures
exchanges, but none of this proposed legislation passed.51
Congress’ next attempt to regulate futures came in 1921 when it
passed the Future Trading Act.52 The Future Trading Act
imposed a twenty cent tax per bushel on every grain futures
contract, but exempted sales on boards of trade designated as
contract markets by the Secretary of Agriculture from this

GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 34. See also Committee
Report on the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at
29 (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/S3217ReportASFILED.pdf
(“By 2008, 59 percent of derivatives were traded over-the-counter, or away from regulated
exchanges, compared to 41 percent in 1998.”).
45 OTC Derivatives Oversight: Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/International/
InternationalInitiatives/oia_otcderovst.html (last visited October 10, 2010).
46 Anti-Gold Futures Act, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 132 (1864).
47 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 9.
48 Anti-Gold Futures Act, 13 Stat. at 132.
49 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 9.
50 Id.
51 Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN.
L. REV. 537, 564 (2009). It should be noted, however, that in 1914, Congress passed the
Cotton Futures Act, which established a system for grading cotton and prohibiting all
cotton futures contracts other than those specified in the Act. The Act was eventually
declared unconstitutional because it was passed under Congress’s taxing power, but did
not originate in the House, and was then replaced by the Cotton Futures Act of 1916. See
Cotton Futures Act Called Void, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1915.
52 Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
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requirement.53 The purpose of this regulation was to prevent
market manipulation by requiring exchanges seeking a contract
market designation to introduce anti-manipulation rules.54 The
twenty cent tax on non-contract market trades made it nearly
impossible to make a profit, and therefore, the Act essentially
coerced trades to be executed on designated contract boards.55
Soon after the Act was passed, however, eight members of the
Chicago Board of Trade sued, and the U.S. Supreme Court
eventually declared the Act unconstitutional.56
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress
passed the Grain Futures Act of 1922.57 The purpose of the
Grain Futures Act was to regulate interstate transactions on
grain futures exchanges.58 Once again, the constitutionality of
the Act was called into question, requiring another Supreme
Court decision.59 In distinguishing the two acts, the Court stated
that:
The Grain Futures Act which is now before us differs from the Future
Trading Act in having the very features the absence of which we
held . . . prevented our sustaining the Future Trading Act. As we
have seen in the statement of the case, the [Grain Futures Act] only
purports to regulate interstate commerce and sales of grain for future
delivery on boards of trade because . . . manipulation . . . [of these
markets] . . . [has] become a constantly recurring burden and
obstruction to [interstate] commerce. Instead, therefore, of being an
authority against the validity of the Grain Futures Act, it is an
authority in its favor.60

In the end, the Court held that the Act’s emphasis on
limiting price manipulation in the futures markets—an event
which had the potential to adversely affect interstate
commerce—was enough to make the Act constitutional under the
commerce clause.61
The Grain Futures Act remained in effect until June 15,
1936, when Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act

Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 45 (1921).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 70. Ultimately, the Court determined that the grain futures contracts at
issue were wholly intrastate transactions, and that the assessment of a twenty cent tax
was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power. See id. at 70–72.
57 Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
58 In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Wallace, Congress expressly
limited the provisions of the Grain Futures Act to boards of trade and individuals
conducting interstate transactions. See id. at § 3.
59 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
60 Id. at 32–33 (1923).
61 Id. at 41–42.
53
54
55
56
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(CEA).62 The CEA, which has been amended numerous times
over the past seventy-five years, created the Commodity
Exchange Authority, a precursor agency to the CFTC.63 The
CFTC—an independent regulatory agency—was created in 1974
when Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA).64
With some minor
exceptions, the CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over
all commodity futures and commodity options contracts.65
At the beginning of the new millennium, Congress again
passed a major piece of legislation amending the CEA. The
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) divided
the universe of commodities into three general categories;
(1) agricultural commodities; (2) exempt commodities; and
(3) excluded commodities.66 This categorization was based on the
apparent susceptibility of certain commodities to manipulation,
with agricultural commodities seen as most vulnerable, exempt
commodities as less vulnerable, and excluded commodities as the
least vulnerable.67
With respect to agricultural commodities, the CEA
specifically enumerates certain articles or goods as
commodities.68 In addition to these specified commodities, the
62 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1–17 (2006)).
63 See Records of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/180.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2010). See also Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly—Reform Is
Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 982 (1991) (“Rather than being an independent
federal agency, such as the SEC, the Commodity Exchange Commission was composed of
the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce and the Attorney
General of the United States. Day-to-day regulation of the statute was given to the
Secretary of Agriculture who assigned this duty to an agency within the department, the
Commodity Exchange Authority.”).
64 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat 1389
(1974) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006)).
65 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2006) provides that: “No person shall . . . enter into . . . any
transaction involving any commodity regulated under this chapter which is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’ . . . contrary to any rule,
regulation, or order of the Commission . . . .” § 2(a)(1)(A) provides that: “The Commission
shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and
transactions [including options] involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future
delivery . . . .”
66 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d sess.
2000).
67 See H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 5a(b)(2)(B) (“A registered derivatives transaction
execution facility may trade any contract of sale of a commodity for future trading . . . only
if . . . (B) the underlying commodity has a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large that
the contract is highly unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation . . . .”).
68 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) enumerates the following commodities:
[W]heat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill
feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats
and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all
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term commodity also includes those articles, goods, services,
rights, or interests “in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in.”69 Therefore, an underlying
interest that is not enumerated in the CEA may nonetheless be a
statutory commodity under the Act if it can reasonably underlie a
futures contract on a forward looking basis.
The CEA defines an exempt commodity to mean “a
commodity that is not an excluded commodity or an agricultural
commodity.”70 The types of commodities that fit within this
definition include oil, gas, electric power, and precious and base
metals.71
Finally, the CEA identifies certain interests as excluded
commodities, thereby giving further depth to the regulatory
purview of the CFTC.72 The definition of an excluded commodity
is comprised of four subsections, and allows for trading of
contracts based on an enumerated list of commercial or economic
indices or rates, whether within the control of contracting parties
or not, and whether these indices or rates are based on
commodities that have no cash market.73 The definition of an
excluded commodity, therefore, appears to open the door to
commodity futures or options contracts based on a wide variety of
events that have an economic consequence.
other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean
meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice . . . .
69 Id.
70 § 1a(14).
71 Congress Re-Enacts Amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, LEGAL NEWS
ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP), June 26, 2008, available at http://www.foley.com/
publications/pub_detail.aspx?pubid=5059.
72 § 1a(13).
73 The Act defines “excluded commodity” as:
(i) an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security, security index, credit risk
or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure of inflation, or other
macroeconomic index or measure;
(ii) any other rate, differential, index, or measure of economic or commercial
risk, return, or value that is–
(I) not based in substantial part on the value of a narrow group of
commodities not described in clause (i); or
(II) based solely on one or more commodities that have no cash market;
(iii) any economic or commercial index based on prices, rates, values, or levels
that are not within the control of any party to the relevant contract,
agreement, or transaction; or
(iv) an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change
in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity not described in clause (i)) that
is–
(I) beyond the control of the parties to the relevant contract, agreement, or
transaction; and
(II) associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.
Id.
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ii. SEC Regulation
As stated above, in order for the CFTC to retain sole
jurisdiction over a particular derivatives contract, the contract
must involve the sale or future delivery of a commodity.74 In
1972, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) created the
International Monetary Market (IMM) to offer futures contracts
in foreign currencies.75 The creation of the IMM began an
explosion of derivatives for non-agricultural products. Because
these products were not easily defined as commodities, it was not
entirely clear that the CFTC retained jurisdictional authority
over them. Some of these products either partially or entirely
contain features of securities, over which the SEC has
jurisdiction.
In 1934, Congress granted the SEC jurisdiction over all
security options products when it passed the Securities Exchange
Act (Exchange Act), and subjected options to the rulemaking
authority of the SEC.76 The SEC did not adopt any such rule
until 1974, however, until after the creation of the Chicago Board
of Options Exchange when it adopted Rule 9b-1.77 Options
trading after the adoption of Rule 9b-1 was on a “pilot basis” only
in order for the SEC to learn about any potential problems that
could cause harm to investors. Rule 9b-1, until it was repealed in
1975,78 prohibited options trading on any exchange except in
accordance with a plan regulating options trading approved by
the SEC.79 The SEC retains jurisdiction over security options
trading to this day. Thus, the SEC retains sole or joint
jurisdiction over security futures and security options products.80
Since the creation of the CFTC, the two agencies have often
battled over which agency has jurisdiction over certain financial
derivatives. These jurisdictional battles eventually led to the
Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord (accord).81 The accord was

§ 2(i).
From Water Street to the World—A Brief History of the Chicago Board of Trade
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, CME MAGAZINE, Summer 2007, available at
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/magazine/Summer2007/FromWaterStreetToT
heWorld.html.
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000).
77 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1974).
78 Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options—Two
Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 748 & n.34 (1982).
79 See § 240.9b-1(a).
80 See Advisory on Dodd-Frank Act: New Rules for Derivatives, COVINGTON &
BURLINGTON LLP (July 21, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/f11bd6db-d8f246d1-b91b-da0b30a44157/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/88322576-8e12-48ab-8c61daca964bb4e0/Dodd-Frank%20Act%20-%20New%20Rules%20for%20Derivatives.pdf.
81 The accord was codified in the Securities Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982). It was the result of an agreement between the Commodity
74
75
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an agreement reached between the Chairmen of SEC and CFTC
to resolve a dispute concerning jurisdiction over securities-based
derivatives.82 Under the accord, the CFTC retained exclusive
jurisdiction over all futures contracts and options on both futures
contracts and physical commodities.83 The CFTC was also given
jurisdiction over options on foreign currencies not traded on
national securities exchanges, and futures and options on futures
on securities indexes and exempted securities.84 The accord
allowed the CFTC to approve a stock index futures contract for
trading if it (1) was settled in cash; (2) not readily susceptible to
manipulation; and (3) derived from a substantial segment of a
publicly traded group or index of equity or debt securities, called
broad-based indexes.85 These contracts were also subject to
initial SEC review for compliance with these requirements, and
the SEC was given the authority to prohibit the trading of these
contracts if the SEC determined that these requirements were
not met.86 Also under the accord, the SEC retained jurisdiction
over securities, including options on securities, options on
certificates of deposit, options on securities indexes, and options
on foreign currency traded on a national securities exchange.87
Because the two agencies could not resolve their jurisdictional
differences with respect to single security futures contract, these
contracts were banned for nearly twenty years until the CFMA

Futures Trading Commission’s Chairman, Phil Johnson, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Chairman, John Shad, to clarify jurisdictional concerns between the two
agencies and their respective products. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-00-89, CFTC AND SEC: ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON
JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD 6 (2000) [hereinafter CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE
SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
2000/gg00089.pdf (“First, [the accord] provided SEC with jurisdiction over securitiesbased options, including stocks and stock indexes. Second, the accord prohibited futures
(and options thereon) on single corporate and municipal securities . . . . Finally, the
accord provided CFTC with jurisdiction over futures (and options thereon) on exempted
securities (other than municipal securities) and stock indexes. The accord allowed CFTC
to approve a stock index futures contract for trading if CFTC found that the contract was
(1) settled in cash; (2) not readily susceptible to manipulation; and (3) based on an index
that either was a widely published measure of and reflected the market as a whole or a
substantial segment of the market, or else was comparable to such a measure. According
to SEC and CFTC, these three standards were intended to ensure that stock index futures
would not be readily susceptible to manipulation, be used to manipulate the underlying
securities or related options markets, or serve as a surrogate for a single stock futures
contract.”).
82 See CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL
ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5.
83 Id. at 6.
84 Id. at 6 & n.13 (“Exempted securities include securities issued or guaranteed by
the United States, the District of Columbia, or any U.S. state.”).
85 Id. at 6.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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once again allowed trading of these instruments.88 Today,
regulation of security futures—instruments considered to be both
securities and futures—is jointly shared by the CFTC and the
SEC.
Despite the various amendments to the CEA and Exchange
Act over the past thirty-five years, the jurisdictional battles
between the CFTC and SEC have continued. At no time was this
battle more intense than during the mid- to late-1990s, when the
two agencies failed to agree on how to regulate OTC
derivatives.89 The CFMA failed to clarify jurisdictional authority
over OTC derivatives—a decision that would ultimately haunt
the U.S. and world financial markets in the years to come.
2. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation
Following the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing
financial collapse of 2008, calls were made by members of
Congress, as well as consumer and investor protection groups, to
regulate the OTC derivatives market. As stated previously, OTC
contracts are entered into privately, off-exchange by parties.
Because these are private contracts, the parties retain control
over settlement and clearing. Despite the impact these
instruments have on the U.S. and international economies, they
remained largely unregulated by either the CFTC or the SEC.90

88 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(32) (2000) (“The term ‘security futures product’ means a security
future or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security future.”).
89 See Ted Bunker, Power Grab Threatens OTC Derivatives Market, BOSTON
HERALD, June 22, 1998, at 26; Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or
Futures? The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC
Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 388, 390–91 (1999) (“In December 1997, the
SEC proposed a rule to allow broker-dealers selling OTC derivatives . . . to establish
designated subsidiaries for their OTC transactions in the U.S.
The designated
subsidiaries would be allowed to register with the SEC as an alternative to registration as
a fully regulated broker-dealer under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act if they combine
their business in securities and non-securities OTC derivatives products. . . . The CFTC
responded . . . by stating that the proposed rule infringed upon the CFTC’s jurisdictional
authority over OTC derivatives transactions . . . because only a small percentage of OTC
derivatives were securities.”). Nonetheless, the rule took effect on January 4, 1999. Id.
90 In a 1994 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the director
of the GAO (and U.S. Comptroller General) stated:
Given the weaknesses and gaps that impede regulatory preparedness for
dealing with a crisis associated with derivatives, GAO recommends that
Congress require federal regulation of the safety and soundness of all major
U.S. OTC derivatives dealers. Regulators should attempt to prevent financial
disruptions from turning into crises and resolve crises to minimize risks to the
financial system . . . . The immediate need is for Congress to bring the
currently unregulated OTC derivatives activities of securities firm and
insurance company affiliates under the purview of one or more of the existing
federal financial regulators and to ensure that derivatives regulation is
consistent and comprehensive across regulatory agencies.
See GAO REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 15, at 14.
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The most infamous OTC derivative contract during the 2008
financial crisis was the credit default swap (CDS).91 CDSs are
bilateral contracts used to transfer risk between protection
buyers and protection sellers.92 As one recent commentator
stated, “CDSs have provided an important tool for risk
management. They enable banks and other financial institutions
to hedge the credit risk of lending to corporations, in turn
facilitating economic activity. Hedging credit risk arguably frees
up funds to be lent elsewhere, making more capital available for
financings, which can reduce the cost of borrowing.”93 CDSs were
invented by Wall Street Banks in the late 1990s, but the size of
the market is estimated to have increased from a notional value
of $632 billion in 2001, to over $54.6 trillion in notional value by
mid 2008.94

91 See Market Survey, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Surveyannual-data.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
92 David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA
ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 1, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf.
93 Janis Sarra, Financial Market Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default
Swaps: An International Perspective On The SEC’s Role Going Forward, 78 U. CIN. L.
REV. 629, 632 (2009). The underlying debate regarding CDSs has existed for centuries.
See Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote
Address at Markit’s Outlook for OTC Derivatives Markets Conference (Mar. 9, 2010),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensler/
opagensler-32.html (“Though credit default swaps have existed for only a relatively short
period of time, the debate they evoke has parallels to debates as far back as 18th Century
England over insurance and the role of speculators. English insurance underwriters in
the 1700s often sold insurance on ships to individuals who did not own the vessels or their
cargo. The practice was said to create an incentive to buy protection and then seek to
destroy the insured property. It should come as no surprise that seaworthy ships began
sinking. In 1746, the English Parliament enacted the Statute of George II, which
recognized that ‘a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering’ had caused ‘great numbers of
ships, with their cargoes, [to] have . . . been fraudulently lost and destroyed.’ The statute
established that protection for shipping risks not supported by an interest in the
underlying vessel would be ‘null and void to all intents and purposes.’”).
94 See Mengle, Credit Derivatives, supra note 92, at 7; News Release: ISDA Mid-Year
2008 Market Survey Shows Credit Derivatives at $54.6 Trillion, INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC. (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.isda.org/press/press092508.html.
For a criticism of the use of notional amount to measure privately negotiated derivatives,
see Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009)
(testimony of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive Officer, International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking), available at
http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/Testimony-of-Robert-Pickel031009.pdf
(“While
using
notional amount as a measurement tool for the size of the privately negotiated derivatives
business has its benefits, it also has a major drawback. Notional amount greatly
overstates the actual exposure represented by the CDS business. One reason for this is
because a seller of protection often seeks to hedge its risk by entering into offsetting
transactions. Using the example above, if the counterparty that sold $10 million of
protection wished to hedge its risk and buy protection, it too would enter into a
$10 million CDS contract. Thus, there are now two CDS contracts outstanding with a
total notional amount of $20 million. The reality is, however, that only $10 million is at
risk.”).
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On July 21, 2010, the President of the United States signed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Financial Reform Act) into law.95 Title VII of the Financial
Reform Act—known as the Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010 (WSTA)—confers jurisdiction of
security-based swaps to the SEC, and all other swaps to the
CFTC.96 Security-based swaps are also added to the definition of
a “security” in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act.97
As such, an offer or sale of a security-based swap by or on behalf
of the issuer of the underlying security, its affiliate or
underwriter is considered an offer or sale of the underlying
security. There is no requirement that the SEC deem an owner
of a security-based swap to be the beneficial owner of the
underlying security, or that the security-based swap have
“incidents of ownership comparable to direct ownership of the
equity security.”98 Both agencies share joint regulatory
jurisdiction over “mixed swaps.”99
The WSTA requires that all swaps and security-based swaps
be cleared, unless an exemption exists.100 The CFTC and SEC
may exempt a swap or security-based swap from clearing if:
(1) the swap or security-based swap is not accepted for clearing
by a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) or a clearing agency
or (2) one party to the contract is not a dealer or major swap or
security-based swap participant and that party does not meet the
eligibility requirement of a DCO/clearing agency.101 All
derivatives clearing organizations are required to submit to the
CFTC for prior approval any swaps the organization seeks to
accept for clearing.102 The CFTC or SEC can stay the clearing
requirement of a swap or security-based swap that it has
95 H.R. 4173: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last visited Nov.
8, 2010).
96 See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 712(b)(1)–(2) (2010).
97 §§ 761(a), 768(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) and 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1),
respectively).
98 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m(o) (LEXIS through P.L. 111-237).
99 H.R. 4173 § 712(a)(8); 7 U.S.C.S. § 1a(49)(D) (LEXIS through P.L. 111-267) (“The
term ‘security-based swap’ includes any agreement, contract, or transaction that is as
described in section 3(a)(68)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
[§] 78c(a)(68)(A)) and also is based on the value of one or more interest or other rates,
currencies, commodities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures,
other financial or economic interest or property of any kind (other than a single security
or a narrow-based security index), or the occurrence, non-occurrence, or the extent of the
occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or
commercial consequence.”).
100 H.R. 4173 §§ 723(a), 763(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2(e)(3) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a(3C)(a), respectively).
101 Id.
102 Id.
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approved for listing upon request of either party to the contract,
or on its own, and must then determine within ninety days
whether the product does or does not need to be cleared.103 A
product that the CFTC or SEC determines does not need to be
cleared is still allowed to be cleared.104
The WSTA, therefore, creates a presumption that OTC
swaps will be cleared through a CCP. Additionally, the WSTA
requires both the CFTC and SEC to adopt rules requiring
maintenance of records of uncleared swap and security-based
swap transactions, respectively, to be made available to one
another.105 Thus, the new legislation confers whole or partial
jurisdiction over most OTC swap transactions, which, along with
the existing jurisdiction over futures and options by the CFTC
and SEC, creates various degrees of regulatory regimes for
nearly all derivative contracts.
By passing the WSTA, Congress took the opportunity to not
only increase regulation of OTC derivatives, but also to address
the potential for on-exchange trading of specific information
aggregation derivative contracts; namely, contracts based on box
office receipt numbers.
II. DOMESTIC BOX OFFICE RECEIPT DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS
In 2008, in response to a substantial number of requests
asking for guidance on the offering and trading of “information
aggregation” financial contracts, the CFTC issued a concept
release on the appropriate regulatory treatment of event based
contracts.106 As the CFTC’s release summarized:
These event contracts generally take the form of financial agreements
linked to eventualities or measures that neither derive from, nor
correlate with, market prices or broad economic or commercial
measures. Event contracts have been based on a wide variety of
interests including the results of presidential elections, the
accomplishment of certain scientific advances, world population
levels, the adoption of particular pieces of legislation, the outcome of
corporate product sales, the declaration of war and the length of
celebrity marriages.107

103 H.R. 4173 §§ 723(a), 763(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(1) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a(3C)(i), respectively).
104 Id.
105 § 712(d)(1)–(3).
106 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts,
E8-9981, 73 Fed. Reg. 25669 (May 7, 2008) [hereinafter Concept Release on the
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Events Contracts], available at http://www.cftc.gov/
LawRegulation/FederalRegister/e8-9981.html.
107 Id.
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Among the reasons for issuing the concept release were to help
determine: (1) whether event based contracts are within the
CFTC’s jurisdiction; (2) if the CFTC does, in fact, have
jurisdiction over these contracts, whether there should be
exemptions or exclusions applied to them; and (3) how to address
potential gambling aspect of some of these contracts.108
A. Benefits of Information Markets
An event based market is generically known as an
“information market.”109 An information market is a relatively
simple operation. The market maker issues a security or
derivative and specifies how these instruments will eventually be
redeemed or settled.110 The various instruments’ payout will be
based on objectively verifiable information at the time of
redemption or settlement (e.g., whether the Federal Reserve
changes the federal funds target rate).111 Individuals who wish
to participate in these markets purchase financial instruments
from the market and subsequently trade these instruments (or
purchase offsetting contracts in the case of derivatives) with one
another.112 The prices at which these transactions occur reflect
market predictions of the eventual payout, and thus, whether the
participants believe a certain event is likely to occur.113
Proponents of information markets point to the efficient
markets hypothesis, which, in essence, states that it is
impossible to beat the market because market efficiency causes
the prices of financial instruments to immediately incorporate
and reflect all relevant information.114 In other words, stocks
traded on a public exchange will always trade at their fair value,
making it impossible for investors to purchase undervalued
stocks or sell inflated stocks. Thus, the hypothesis maintains
that it is impossible to outperform the overall market. In an
efficient information market, the market price of the financial
instrument will theoretically be the best indicator of whether an
event will actually occur or not, and no combination of polling or
other information gathering techniques can in any way improve
upon the market generated forecasts. The advantage of having a
price signal market for information is that the market aggregates
the publicly and privately known information, as well as the
Id.
Matthew Einbinder, Information Markets: Using Market Predictions to Make
Administrative Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 149, 150 (2006).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 151.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991).
108
109
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tastes of a large number of participants, which produce
judgments that incorporate more data than could be assembled
centrally.115
In order for these markets to perform as advertised, though,
market participants must trade rationally. Rational trading is
certain to occur in these markets by virtue of the fact that
market participants have a financial incentive to disclose their
beliefs about future events. Unlike marketing research, polling,
or other information gathering techniques, information market
participants have no incentive to lie or conceal their beliefs.
Additionally, individual positions in regulated information
markets cannot be revealed. This means that market
participants need not fear potential negative consequences of
making their beliefs known—a fear that cannot necessarily be
allayed in other types of group information gathering methods.
For some market participants, rational trading will also
mean manipulation of the markets in an effort to increase the
financial stake in their particular market positions.116 For this
reason, there is a clear need for market regulation, particularly
anti-manipulation provisions.
Anti-manipulation techniques
take the form of financial disclosures to regulators and the
markets themselves, as well as position and capital limits.117 An
information market, if regulated by the CFTC or SEC, would be
subject to anti-manipulation provisions, which makes regulated
markets more desirable than unregulated markets.
It should be equally clear that these types of markets are
limited in how much information can be learned. For instance, a
certain market may be able to accurately predict who will next be
elected President, but does not have the capability to discern
whether a particular policy assurance by a candidate is desired
by the public.118 This, of course, underpins one of the tenants of
economics: that missing markets lead to inefficiency.119
The classic example of this theory was first analyzed fifty
years ago by Nobel Prize winning economist Ronald Coase.120
Imagine, for example, that a candy maker operates noisy

115 Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and
Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1023 (2005).
116 Id. at 1036.
117 Id. at 1048.
118 One could argue that a candidate’s policy assurances are the reason that he or she
is likely to be elected, but there is a difference between whether someone is likely to be
elected, and whether the public agrees with a particular campaign promise.
119 See, e.g., Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON.
143, 144–50 (1954).
120 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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equipment next door to a doctor’s office. The candy maker, by
pursuing his own interests, is interfering with the doctor’s
examination of patients. While the candy maker derives benefits
from his operation, the doctor surely suffers. Economists call this
type of interference a negative externality, or as Coase put it, a
social cost.121 An unbiased observer may decide that the candy
maker should merely shut down his business in order for the
doctor to serve the welfare of the public. This overlooks the
damage that such a solution would cause to the candy maker.
The same is true, of course, were the onlooker to decide that the
doctor should shut down his practice. Thus, there appears to be
an impasse, or more precisely, an inefficiency given the fact that
both individuals cannot operate their businesses side-by-side.
This dilemma can be solved, however, by the creation of a
market. In such a market, the candy maker and doctor would
determine how much money one would need to compensate the
other with in order to close down their respective businesses.
The eventual solution depends on the relative size of the gains
and losses of the parties. Coase’s example demonstrates that
inefficiencies are caused by a lack of markets.122 The take away,
though, is that information markets have the potential to be very
valuable resources, but enough markets must exist (or be allowed
to exist) in order for significant amounts of information to be
learned.123 Although a single information market is inevitably an
imperfect information discovery vehicle, there seems to be some
consensus that contracts traded on these types of markets
provide capable—if not highly accurate—predictive tools.124
B. Existing Event Based Markets
The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) is an electronic trading
facility operated by the University of Iowa Henry B. Tippie
College of Business that functions as an experimental and
academic program, and is one of the better known real-money
information markets currently in operation.125 The IEM has
been in existence since 1988, and operates in part pursuant to a
1993 no-action letter issued by the CFTC, which allowed the IEM
to list various event contracts subject to certain conditions and

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3–4.
Sunstein, supra note 115, at 962.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative
Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 950 (2004).
125 About IEM, UNIV. OF IOWA TIPPIE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, http://tippie.uiowa.edu/
iem/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
121
122
123
124
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limitations.126 The IEM continues to be recognized for its
presidential and congressional election contracts.127 Currently,
the IEM offers markets for 2010 Senate and House of
Representatives “control,” as well as a Federal Reserve monetary
policy market.128
In 2008, the IEM offered vote share and winner-take-all
contracts for the U.S. presidential election cycle.129 The vote
share contract was associated with the candidates nominated by
each party, with each contract having a maximum value of one
dollar, and a contract payout “directly based on the percentage of
the popular vote received by each of the two major party
candidates.”130 For instance, a contract for a candidate who
received twenty-five percent of the popular votes cast for both
candidates was worth twenty-five cents at settlement.131 The
winner-take-all contract, in contrast, had a value of either one
dollar or nothing at settlement.132 These contracts were also
associated with a specific candidate, but “instead of having a
payout tied to a particular percentage of the popular vote
received by each candidate,” the contract “distributed a fixed
payout of $1 to its holder only if the referenced candidate
receive[d] a greater percentage of the popular vote cast.”133
Another well-known event based market is the Hollywood
Stock Exchange (HSX) which markets itself as the “world’s
leading entertainment stock market.”134 The HSX, which was
founded in 1996, is now a subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.—
a financial services provider that offers clients financial products

126 Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading and
Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, University of Iowa (June 18,
1993), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b004.pdf. This no-action
letter superseded a more limited letter issued to the IEM in 1992, and extends the CFTC’s
no-action relief to contracts based on political elections, economic indicators, and certain
currency exchange rates. Id. The letter requires that the IEM limit access to any one
submarket to between 1,000 and 2,000 traders. Id. The letter also sets the maximum
amount that any single participant can risk in any one submarket at $500. The letter
makes clear that relief is premised on, among other factors, the IEM’s representation that
the market is being operated for academic purposes, and the assurance that the IEM will
not receive any profit or other form of compensation from its activities. Id.
127 Current
Markets, UNIV. OF IOWA TIPPIE COLLEGE OF BUSINESS,
http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/markets/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
128 Id.
129 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts,
supra note 106.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 About HSX, HSX, http://www.HSX.com/about/?page=index (last visited Sept. 27,
2010).
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and services in the equity and fixed income capital markets.135
The HSX allows individuals to buy and sell virtual shares of
celebrities and movies with a currency called the Hollywood
Dollar.136 The HSX is less of an information market than the
IEM because participants are not using real money,137 but it
nonetheless provides a realistic framework for other—more
authentic—information markets. Despite the faux nature of the
HSX, it has proved to be a relatively accurate predictor of box
office success or failure.138 As one recent commentator noted, the
“HSX offers good predictions of a film’s gross receipts before
release and, relatively speaking, even better predictions after
opening weekend—when a large number of traders have some
information in the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing
the finished film on screen, along with audience reactions.”139 By
not allowing participants to conduct real trading operations, the
HSX avoids securities and derivatives regulation, while still
allowing individuals to predict the success of films.140
While many individuals are interested in politics or Federal
Reserve monetary policy, there are some who are undoubtedly
more engrossed in the success or failure of major motion pictures.
This, of course, was the thinking when Cantor Futures
Exchange, L.P.—another subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.—
and Media Derivatives, Inc. applied for designation as contract
markets in which individuals would be able to trade real
domestic box office receipt derivatives.141
C. The Purpose of DBOR Derivative Exchanges
Supporters of domestic box office receipt (DBOR) derivative
exchanges claim that such markets will assist the motion picture
industry by expanding the number of potential financing sources

Id.
Id.
This statement is based on the assumption that individuals will behave more
rationally when their own money is at stake. Thus, an individual is less likely to merely
guess or enter into riskier contracts which, while providing the potential for a larger
payoff, are also less likely to actually payoff. See Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction
Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 243, 250 (2004), available at
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/DoesMoneyMatter.pdf (finding no
difference in the predictive accuracy between real money and play money exchanges
during the 2003 NFL football season).
138 Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from
the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 593
(2003).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 592–93.
141 See infra note 159.
135
136
137
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available, as well as allowing film companies and investors to
limit their risk.142
Historically, film companies raised financing through public
or private sources, but the number of equity investors has
decreased dramatically over the past thirty years.143 One of the
reasons for this decrease in capital is the risk involved in making
a motion picture. Even though there are anywhere between 600
and 700 films produced each year, only about 200 of these obtain
a release that could potentially lead to any sort of return, let
alone a profit.144 When a blockbuster does occur, though, it can
make up for the losses on these other films.145 Unfortunately,
significant capital is required to make enough films to ensure
that at least one studio film will be a blockbuster.
The most common film financing technique is known as a
banking pre-sale.146 This approach involves the assembly of a
package involving a script, director, and key cast members.147
Once the film package is complete, the producer engages an
agent to pre-sell the film throughout the world at various film
markets.148 However, “[m]any films do not make it past the film
markets.”149 Pre-selling films has become more difficult, though,
and distributors are now waiting until films are in production
before committing to license them.150 For those films that are
financed, very few are done on an individual basis.151 Film
financiers generally engage in “slate financing,” whereby an
investor finances a portfolio of future films, thus spreading
around—and decreasing—the risk that an investor’s capital will
be lost.152 With slate financing, however, the investor does not
142 See Nikki Finke, Worst Idea Ever? Wall Street Plans Futures Exchange Tied to Box
Office, DEADLINE N.Y. (Dec. 9, 2008, 11:23 AM), http://www.deadline.com/2008/12/wallstree-firm-planning-futures-exchange-tied-to-movie-sales/ (quoting a financial source
explaining that such exchanges “could lead to another source of revenue for studios who
can make their own bets on movies they are releasing to increase total revenue take or
hedge losses”).
143 Schuyler M. Moore, Raising Film Financing by Betting the Box, 24 ENTM’T L. REP.
4, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Moore, Raising Film Financing].
144 See Schuyler M. Moore, Financing Drama, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 2 [hereinafter
Moore, Financing Drama] (“Many events may cause films to lose money, such as budget
overages, third-party claims, misappropriation and, of course, artistic failure.”).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 4.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 4 (“Average worldwide presales have
shrunk from about 100 percent of a film’s budget in the heyday of the financing technique
to less than 70 percent today.”).
151 Id. at 4–6.
152 See Norbert Morawetz, Finance, Policy and Industrial Dynamics The Rise of
Coproductions in the Film Industry, at n.xi (June 18–20, 2007), http://www2.druid.dk/
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always know what films are being financed, and thus, the
investor is essentially investing blind.153
Anyone who invests in a film project presumably does so
with the expectation that the film (or slate of films) will provide a
positive net return. Clearly, film financiers have an incentive to
reduce their financial risk, which allows these individuals or
companies to survive if a film flops. One of the most common
ways to reduce risk is for film companies to enter into split-rights
transactions, whereby two or more companies co-finance a film
with one taking domestic rights, and the other taking foreign
rights.154 The downside to this type of contract is that when
companies enter into contracts where profits are shared over two
territories, the valuable distribution rights, and about half the
profits, are given away to competitors.
Nonetheless, this
approach has become widespread despite the fact that film
companies are in the business of owning and exploiting film
rights.155
Film financing and hedging obviously go hand in hand. An
individual or organization is more likely to invest in a film if
assurances can be made that there will be a limit to the potential
financial losses, while still providing for potential financial gains.
The purpose of DBOR derivative markets, therefore, is to allow
the parties with financial interests in a film’s revenue stream to
hedge against the risks associated with producing, distributing,
financing, and insuring motion pictures.156 The individuals and
organizations potentially included in this group include:
(1) owners of screenplays; (2) debt and equity investors in a
particular film or slate of films; (3) film talent who either benefit
directly from box office receipts or whose future career prospects
depend on appearance in quality films; (4) studios who need a
steady revenue stream to continue production if movie
investment dries up; (5) insurers of film talent and movies;
(6) theaters whose revenue stream depends on people purchasing
tickets to see a film; (7) film distributors; and (8) promotional

conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1671&cf=9 (explaining that, “[r]ather than relying on a
single top-or-flop project, equity funds and studios use a portfolio approach to film
financing where risk is spread across a slate of films”) (citation omitted).
153 Cyrus Sanati, Movie Time at the C.F.T.C. Draws Heated Debate, N.Y. TIMES BLOG
(May 19, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/heated-debateduring-movie-time-at-the-c-f-t-c/.
154 Moore, Raising Film Financing, supra note 144, at 4.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Randall Dodd, Derivatives Study Ctr., Derivatives Markets: Sources of
Vulnerability
in
U.S.
Financial
Markets,
at
2
(Nov.
15,
2001),
http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfspr8.pdf (explaining that derivatives, in general, are
used to “hedge the risks normally associated with commerce and finance”).
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marketing partners (e.g., fast food chains) who produce or sell
products associated with particular films.
It should be noted that these individuals or organizations
could potentially benefit from an exchange. This is not to say
that these markets will actually be used by these individuals or
organizations. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, when seeking the
source of inefficiencies, one should look for missing markets, and
allow potential participants to decide whether these products and
markets are right for them.157
D. History of DBOR Derivative Exchanges
In 2008, Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P. (Cantor) and Media
Derivatives, Inc. (MDEX)158 applied for designation as contract
markets in which individuals and organizations would be able to
trade DBOR derivative contracts.159 The process of creating an
exchange on which derivatives are traded can be broken down
into two main parts: (1) designation of the exchange as a contract
(or other type) of market, and (2) approval of the contracts
proposed for trading on the exchange.
1. CFTC Approval of DBOR Markets
When the CEA was amended in 2000 by the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), a three-tiered market
framework was created.160 Since the enactment of the Grain
Futures Act in 1922, the CFTC, or its precursor agencies, have
regulated exchanges known as designated contract markets

157 At a May 19, 2010 hearing before the CFTC, Clark Hallren and Alice Neuhauser
stated that they are not aware of any OTC derivative market where the contracts are
linked to box office receipts. Opponents of DBOR derivatives would suggest that the lack
of an OTC market tends to indicate that no one would use a DBOR exchange. The flip
side of this argument is that the lack of an OTC market could mean that a potential party
is merely unable to find a counterparty for its desired contract. Additionally, one benefit
that an exchange has over an OTC market is that exchanges and regulators are required
to keep individual positions confidential. During this same hearing, CFTC Commissioner
Gary Gensler acknowledged that about seventy percent of all contracts submitted to the
CFTC for trading approval fail due to lack of trading volume. See Live Blogging! The
CFTC Public Meeting on Movie Box Office Futures, JABCAT ON MOVIES (May 19, 2010),
http://jabcatmovies.com/2010/05/live-blogging-the-cftc-public-meeting-on-movie-box-officefutures.
158 In correspondence with the CFTC dated May 20, 2010, MDEX changed its name to
Trend Exchange, Inc. This article, however, will continue to refer to this entity as MDEX.
159 See Application for DCO Registration of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/cantordcoapplicationlett
er.pdf; Media Derivatives, Inc. Background Paper (August 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/mdex092509b.pdf.
160 See supra note 66.
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(DCMs).161
DCMs “may list for trading futures or option
contracts based on any underlying commodity, index or
instrument.”162 However, in addition to DCMs, the CFMA
created less regulated organized markets known as derivatives
transaction execution facilities (DTEF).163 The CFMA also
authorized the creation of “exempt boards of trade”164 (exempt
boards) and “excluded electronic trading facilities” (EETF).165
The exempt board and EETF provisions of the CFMA provided a
means for establishing trading facilities for certain derivative
transactions (e.g., energy, metal, chemical, and emissions
futures) that remain largely outside the scope of the CFTC’s
regulatory authority, with the exception that exempt boards
remain subject to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulations
prohibitions of the CEA.166 EETFs, however, are not subject to
these prohibitions.167
DCMs remain subject to strict regulatory requirements by
the CFTC.168 Specifically, the CFMA amended the CEA to
require entities requesting a contract market designation to
demonstrate that it meets eight designation criteria,169 and

161 History
of
the
Current
Regulatory
Framework,
STA
UNIV.,
http://www.stauniversity.org/content/History%20of%20the%20Current%20Regulatory%20
Framework%20-%20Futures%20Regulation.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
162 Designated Contract Markets, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.htm
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2010).
163 Susan C. Ervin Dechert, CFTC Regulation of Energy Derivatives: An Overview
(Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/clearinghouse/
02annual/37/ervin.pdf.
164 7 U.S.C. § 7a-3(b) (2000). Transactions conducted on an exempt board must be
between eligible contract participants. Permissible transactions for an exempt board of
trade are limited to transactions “for which the underlying commodity has: (A) a nearly
inexhaustible deliverable supply; (B) a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large, and a
cash market sufficiently liquid, to render any contract traded on the commodity highly
unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation; or (C) no cash market.” Id.
Transactions on an exempt board are subject to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
provisions of the CEA. See § 7a-3(c).
165 § 2(d)(2). The CEA does not apply to contracts (i) entered into only by eligible
contract participants trading on a principal-to-principal basis or in certain investment
management or fiduciary capacities, and (ii) done so on an electronic trading facility. See
id.
166 Congress Makes Changes to the Regulation of Futures and Derivatives
Transactions, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 2001), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/
fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/EAB1D60E-C2CE-47DC-BEB42D6B543759878.cfm.
167 Id.
168 See § 7(d).
169 § 7(b). The eight designation criteria are: (1) general demonstration of adherence
to designation criteria; (2) prevention of market manipulation; (3) fair and equitable
trading; (4) enforcement of rules on the trade execution facility; (5) financial integrity of
transactions; (6) disciplinary procedures; (7) public access to information on the contract
market; and (8) ability of the contract market to obtain information. Id.
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complies with eighteen core principles.170 The CEA requires that
the CFTC approve or deny a designation application within 180
days of the filing of the application.171 If the CFTC denies the
application, it must specify the grounds for the denial.172
Following a refusal to designate an applicant as a contract
market, the CFTC must provide the applicant with an
opportunity for a hearing on the record before the CFTC.173 A
DCM applicant thereafter has a right to appeal an adverse
decision directly to a federal appeals court.174
Despite
designating over fifty DCMs over the years, as of December 2010,
the CFTC oversaw only seventeen DCMs where trading was
active or anticipated.175
In addition to amending the requirements for achieving a
contract market designation, the CFMA created less regulated
DTEFs. DTEFs are subject to a less comprehensive body of core
principles than contract markets,176 but in exchange for this less
stringent regulatory oversight, are limited in the types of
contracts it can offer and the types of parties who are allowed to
participate in the transactions.177 There are currently no DTEFs
regulated by the CFTC.178
170 § 7(d)(1)–(18).
The eighteen core principles contract markets are subject to
include: (1) general adherence to these core principles; (2) compliance with the rules;
(3) listing of products not subject to manipulation; (4) monitoring of trading; (5) position
limits; (6) emergency authority; (7) disclosure of information; (8) trading data
dissemination; (9) execution of transactions; (10) trade information maintenance;
(11) financial integrity; (12) protection of market participants; (13) dispute resolution;
(14) fitness standards; (15) conflicts of interest; (16) governance of mutually owned
markets; (17) recordkeeping; and (18) antitrust considerations. Id.
171 § 8(a). The CEA also contains a provision for staying the running of the 180-day
time limit when an exchange is notified that the application for contract market
designation is materially incomplete, and provides the Commission with at least sixty
days for review once the application has been resubmitted in completed form. Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (Supp. II 1965).
175 Trading
Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://services.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizations&implicit=true&type
=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Trading Organizations].
176 § 7a(d)(2)–(9).
The eight core principles for DTEFs are subject to include:
(1) compliance with rules; (2) monitoring of trading; (3) disclosure of information; (4) daily
publication of trading information; (5) fitness standards; (6) conflicts of interest;
(7) recordkeeping; and (8) antitrust considerations. Id.
177 See § 7a(b). If access to a DTEF is limited to eligible commercial entities trading
for their own accounts, the DTEF may permit trading involving any commodity other
than an agricultural commodity, and if access to a DTEF is not so limited, transactions
are restricted to contracts where:
(A) the underlying commodity has a nearly inexhaustible deliverable supply;
(B) the underlying commodity has a deliverable supply that is sufficiently large
that the contract is highly unlikely to be susceptible to the threat of
manipulation; (C) the underlying commodity has no cash market; (D)(i) the
contract is a security futures product and (ii) the [DTEF] is [also registered as
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EETFs and exempt boards, as stated above, were largely
exempted from the CFTC’s regulatory authority by the CFMA,
and therefore these entities need not comply with any
designation criteria or core principles.
On April 16, 2010 and April 20, 2010, respectively, the CFTC
approved MDEX and Cantor’s applications for registration as
DCMs.179 The CFTC noted that MDEX and Cantor’s applications
did not include any proposed DBOR derivative contracts to be
traded on the exchanges, but rather, the approval was based on
the proposed general operations of the exchanges.180 Further, the
CFTC observed that the general operations of the exchanges may
not be appropriate for all types of DBOR contracts, because
certain contracts may require special surveillance or compliance
measures.181 For this reason, the CFTC ordered MDEX and
Cantor to not only ensure the appropriateness of particular
products for trading on the exchanges, but also required the two
exchanges to submit to the CFTC any contracts that the two
exchanges anticipate listing on the exchanges for prior
approval.182
By requiring prior approval of DBOR contracts, the CFTC
impeded MDEX and Cantor from conducting any business. As
stated previously, registration as a DCM is only half of an
exchange’s battle. Without products to list, a DCM is analogous
to a doctor without patients.

a national securities exchange] . . .; [or] (E) the [CFTC] determines, based on
the market characteristics, surveillance history, self-regulatory record and
capacity of the facility that trading in the contract (or option) is highly unlikely
to be susceptible to the threat of manipulation . . . .
Id.

Trading Organizations, supra note 175.
Order of Designation as a Contract Market by the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n at 2, In re Request of Media Derivatives, Inc. (Apr. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market], available at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexorder041510.pdf;
Order of Designation as a Contract Market by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n at 1, In re Request of Cantor Futures Exchange, L.P., (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter
Cantor
Order
of
Designation
as
a
Contract
Market],
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/cantorfuturesexchan
georder.pdf.
180 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 2; Cantor
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 3–4.
181 Application for Contract Market Designation Compliance with Designation
Criteria and Core Principles, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@requestsandactions/documents/ifdocs/cantordcmc
ompliancechart.pdf.
182 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 2; Cantor
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 4.
178
179
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2. CFTC Approval of DBOR Products
Even before the CFTC designated MDEX and Cantor as
contract markets, both exchanges submitted proposed contracts
for listing on their respective exchanges.183 On March 9, 2010,
MDEX requested prior CFTC approval to list an opening
weekend DBOR futures and binary option184 contract on the
motion picture Takers.185 On March 30, 2010, Cantor requested
approval to trade derivatives contracts on its DCM for the motion
picture The Expendables.186
In addition to creating a three-tiered framework for
derivative markets, the CFMA also amended the CEA’s listing
requirements by now allowing exchanges to choose between
listing contracts pursuant to a self-certification procedure, or
pursuant to a prior review procedure by the CFTC.187 By filing a
self-certification, an exchange certifies that the contract complies
with the CEA, and is required to submit the certification
documents to the CFTC no later than one business day before
initial implementation of the product listing.188 The CFMA made
it possible, therefore, for trading to occur on contracts that are
subsequently banned by the CFTC, merely by self-certifying the
contract in good faith. On the other hand, if prior approval of a
contract is sought, the exchange must submit to the CFTC the
contract’s terms and conditions, and demonstrate compliance
with CFTC regulations.189 Products submitted for prior approval
are subject to a forty-five day review period, with the potential
for a forty-five day extension if the product raises a “novel or
complex” issue.190

183 MDEX Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 1; Cantor
Order of Designation as a Contract Market, supra note 179, at 1.
184 A binary option “is a type of options trading where the payoff is either some fixed
amount of some asset or nothing at all.” Binary Options Trading, 1 ANYOPTION,
http://www.1anyoption.com/tag/binary-option-trading/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). Thus,
options that are binary in nature allow for only two possible outcomes. For example, an
individual purchases a binary call option on XYZ, Inc.’s stock with a strike price of $75
and a binary payoff of $500. If, on or before the maturity date, the stock trades at $75 or
above, the purchaser of the option receives $500. If the stock expires before reaching $75
or more, the purchaser receives nothing and is out the option premium.
185 See Statement of the Commission, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
June 14, 2010 [hereinafter Statement of the Commission], available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissionstatement061410.pdf.
186 See Request by Cantor Exchange For Review and Approval of the The Expendables
Futures Contract, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, June 28, 2010, available
at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/
cantorfuturesdbororder062810.pdf.
187 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c) (2000).
188 See 17 C.F.R. § 40.6 (2009).
189 17 C.F.R. § 40 app. A.
190 17 C.F.R. § 40.3.
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Given the relatively novel nature of these contracts, the
CFTC required MDEX and Cantor to submit proposed contracts
to the CFTC for prior approval before trading.191 On May 19,
2010, the Commission held a public hearing to consider issues
related to the trading of DBOR futures and binary options.192 As
the Commission noted during this meeting, the CEA provides
that the CFTC must approve a contract submitted for prior
approval within ninety days, unless it finds that the contract
violates the CEA.193 As stated earlier, the CEA grants the CFTC
jurisdiction over contracts for the sale of a commodity for future
delivery and over commodity option contracts traded on DCMs,
and therefore, the CFTC, in reviewing MDEX and Cantor’s
applications for prior approval of their DBOR contracts, was
required to determine whether the underlying subject of these
contracts was a commodity.194
i. CFTC’s Finding that DBORs are Commodities
The CFMA separated the universe of commodities into three
categories: (1) agricultural commodities; (2) exempt commodities;
and (3) excluded commodities.195 In the order approving MDEX’s
DBOR contract, the CFTC noted that “[m]ovie revenues fall into
the same category as many other commodities for which futures
and options contracts have been either approved by or selfcertified to the Commission where the underlying commodity is a
non-price-based measure of an economic activity, commercial

191 Dan M. Berkovitz, General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading Comm.,
Remarks at Public Meeting to Consider the Trading of Contracts Based on Motion Picture
Box Office Receipts and Gather Views of Interested Parties (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter
Berkovitz Remarks], available at www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/
title/trasncripts051910.
192 For an archived webcast of this meeting, see Consideration of the Trading of
Contracts Based on Motion Picture Box Office Receipts, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N, http://capitolconnection.net/capcon/cftc/webcastarchive.htm# (last
visited Sept. 14, 2010).
193 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-2(c)(3) (West 2009) (requiring the CFTC to “approve any such new
contract or instrument . . . unless the Commission finds that the new contract or
instrument . . . would violate this chapter”);; 17 C.F.R. § 40.3(b)–(c) (“All products
submitted for Commission approval . . . shall be deemed approved . . . forty-five days after
receipt . . . . The Commission may extend the forty-five day review period . . . for: (1) [a]n
additional forty-five days, if the product raises novel or complex issues . . . .”);; 17 C.F.R.
§ 40.3(d) (“The Commission . . . may notify the submitting entity that it will not, or is
unable to, approve the product or instrument.”).
194 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 2 n.3 (“In the great majority of
new product reviews, the answer to this question is obvious and requires no explicit
analysis. However, such a determination was made prior to Commission approval of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s single-name Credit Event contracts.”).
195 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d sess.
2000); Jayashree B. Gokhale, Hedge to Arrive Contracts: Futures of Forwards, 53 DRAKE
L. REV. 55, 56 n.3 (2004).
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activity or environmental event.”196 The Commission has found
that such a commodity is a right or interest within the meaning
of section 1(a)(4) of the CEA:197 “While the right or interest may
be intangible, it can clearly serve as the basis for a futures or
options contract.”198
The Commission’s order did not explicitly say which of the
three categories of commodities DBORs fall under, but the
language of the order makes it apparent that box office receipts
fall under the category of excluded commodities.199 The CEA
defines an excluded commodity as “an occurrence . . . associated
with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.”200
Despite the fact that the CFTC had never previously dealt with
DBOR
derivative
contracts,
the
Commission’s
order
acknowledged that more than five hundred similarly excluded
commodity contracts were submitted to the CFTC for prior
approval or self-certified since the CFMA was enacted.201
ii. DBOR Contracts Do Not Appear to be Subject to
Manipulation
Having passed the threshold issue of whether DBORs are
commodities, the CFTC addressed the issue of whether these
DBOR derivative contracts satisfied the core principles
established by the CFMA.
Under the third core principle of the CEA, in order to
maintain its standing, a DCM is required to list “only contracts
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.”202 Unlike state
and federal securities laws, U.S. derivative regulations do not
make insider trading unlawful. Nonetheless, prior to approving
MDEX’s contracts, the Commission insisted that modifications be
made to the contract proposal to ensure that knowledgeable
parties cannot intentionally release or misreport data that would
have an impact on the trading or settlement of this contract.203
Because DBOR contracts are cash-settled (as opposed to
physically delivered), the Commission must be sure that the
settlement price upon which these contracts are based is not
subject to manipulation. The vast majority of DBOR numbers

Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 3.
Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 4.
200 7 U.S.C. § 1a(13)(iv) (2000).
201 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 3 (“More than 500 of these types
of contracts have been approved by or self-certified to the Commission to date.”).
202 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3) (2000).
203 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 4–5.
196
197
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are reported by Rentrak Corporation (Rentrak) and disseminated
throughout the film industry.204 Rentrak is a third-party data
aggregator and does not have a direct monetary interest in any
motion picture.205 Essentially, Rentrak transfers box office
revenue numbers from movie theaters to distributors.206 These
numbers are used mostly by film studios as marketing tools
(e.g., advertising a film as the number one grossing movie at the
box office). Since 2008, Rentrak has collected more than ninetyeight percent of all box office revenue numbers, with the
remaining box office numbers being delivered directly from
theaters to distributors.207 Because the majority of data is
automated, there is little opportunity for “misrepresentation or
distortion of the numbers reported to Rentrak by the theaters.”208
The Commission found that the price basis for DBOR contracts
(i.e., Rentrak’s numbers) are quite similar to other commodity
pricing data (e.g., energy contracts that rely on data from
commercial index providers and agricultural contracts that rely
on data provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture), and
therefore, do not appear susceptible to manipulation.209
iii. DBOR Contracts Provide a Reasonable Hedging
Device
Although repealed by the CFMA, the CEA used to require
CFTC staff to apply an economic purpose test when evaluating
proposed DCM contracts.210 Specifically, the economic purpose
test only allowed trading of contracts that would “not be contrary
to the public interest.”211 The CFTC, in interpreting this section,
found that a contract that was not contrary to the public interest
must serve a legitimate hedging purpose.212
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6 (known as “call around” data).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
See id. at 9.
7 U.S.C. § 7(g) (1974) (“When such board of trade demonstrates that transactions
for future delivery in the commodity for which designation as a contract market is sought
will not be contrary to the public interest.”).
212 Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts,
supra note 106, at 25672 (“The public interest test . . . included an ‘economic purpose’ test,
subject to a final test of the public interest. The economic purpose test . . . was used to
prohibit the trading of certain contracts. Notably, the economic purpose test regarding
contracts appropriate for trading on a futures exchange was not necessarily congruent
with the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, while futures contracts that
failed the economic purpose test were prohibited from trading on futures exchanges and
thus illegal because of the on-exchange trading requirement, they (and any instrument
with identical terms) remained futures contracts, fully subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction.”).
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
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Despite the repeal of the economic purpose test, the findings
and purpose section of the CEA, as amended by the CFMA, finds
that transactions subject to the CEA have a significant impact on
the public interest because they provide a “means for managing
and assuming price risks.”213 The CFTC recognized in its order
that some commentators have suggested that the findings and
purpose section of the CEA reestablishes an economic purpose
test.214 Nonetheless, because the economic purpose test was
repealed by the CFMA, the Commission declined to adopt the
test in determining whether to approve DBOR derivative
contracts.215
Despite declining to apply the pre-CFMA economic purpose
test, the CFTC did evaluate whether MDEX’s DBOR contracts
would provide some reasonable means for managing risks
associated with box office revenues.216 In conducting its analysis,
the Commission assessed the risks faced by individuals
associated with box office revenues.217 The Commission noted
that “[f]ilm production requires a significant amount of upfront
capital with long lead times to completion. In addition, film
financing can involve pre-selling in the form of office space leases
for construction and transactions with foreign distributors or
television providers.”218 In order to deal with these risks, film
studios have been required to rely on third party financial
investors.219 In light of public comments and written testimony
submitted to the CFTC, the Commission believed that third
party investors would potentially utilize DBOR futures to
mitigate their commercial exposure.220 The Commission also
agreed with the authors of many public comment letters who
stated that DBOR contracts “would provide a risk management
213 7 U.S.C. § 5(a) (2000) (“The transactions subject to this chapter are entered into
regularly in interstate and international commerce and are affected with a national public
interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices,
or disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure
trading facilities.”).
214 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 9. At the May 19th hearing on
DBOR derivatives, CFTC General Counsel, Dan Berkovitz, stated that:
[I]n 2000 . . . [Congress] . . . took out the public interest test, but . . . we believe
that within the findings and purposes [section of the CEA] together with the
requirement that the Commission find that and not be violative of the Act that
there still is authority within the statute for the Commission . . . [to reject a
contract] . . . in a circumstance where the Commission would believe that the
contract would violate the finding and the purpose of the Act . . . .
Berkovtiz Remarks, supra note 191, at 78–79.
215 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 9–10.
216 Id. at 10.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 10–11.
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tool or expressed interest in using the contracts for hedging.”221
Those authors “stated that direct participants in the motion
picture industry, such as studios and producers, may benefit
from having motion picture revenue futures contracts.”222
In light of the Commission hearing on DBOR contracts and
the public comments submitted to the CFTC, the Commission
approved MDEX’s DBOR contract on the movie Takers for
trading on its DCM on June 14, 2010, and Cantor’s DBOR
contract on the movie The Expendables on June 28, 2010.223
Approval by the CFTC on MDEX’s contracts, however, was short
lived.224 Once the Financial Reform Act was signed into law by
the President, trading of DBOR derivatives became a banned
activity.225
E. Ban on DBOR Exchange Products
As stated earlier, the Financial Reform Act was passed in
response to the financial collapse of 2008, and imposed sweeping
changes to the U.S. financial regulatory system, including the
regulation of derivatives.226 Among these changes was the joint
regulation of the previously unregulated OTC swap market by
the SEC and CFTC.227
The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act
(WSTA), in addition to increasing regulation over swaps, banned
trading of box office derivatives.228 Specifically, the Act amended
the definition of a commodity in the CEA to include an
enumerated list of agricultural commodities
and all other goods and articles, except onions . . . and motion picture
box office receipts (or any index, measure, value, or data related to
such receipts), and all services, rights, and interests (except motion

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11–12 (approving MDEX’s product request); Statement of the Commission,
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, June 28, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/dborcommissionstateme
nt0622810.pdf (approving Cantor’s futures contract on The Expendables).
224 Paul Harris, House-Senate Committee Bans Futures Trading: MPAA 'Heartened'
With Decision; Major Blow to Exchange Companies, VARIETY (Jun. 25, 2010, 10:29 AM),
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118021065.html?categoryid=13&cs=1.
225 Id.
226 Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/
index.html (last updated Jul. 21, 2010).
227 Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§§ 712(a)–(b) (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf
(dividing jurisdiction over security-based swaps with the SEC and all other swaps with
the CFTC).
228 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 721(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1659 (2010).
221
222
223

Do Not Delete

448

3/16/2011 5:16 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:415

picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, value or data
related to such receipts) in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in.229

In changing the definition of a commodity, Congress, without
conducting a hearing on the issue prior to drafting the Financial
Reform Act,230 banned trading of all DBOR derivatives.231
Beginning in 1864 with the Anti-Gold Futures Act, Congress has
occasionally attempted to ban trading of derivatives on specific
commodities and other underlying instruments. As of December
2010, however, DBORs—along with onions—were the only two
commodities on which Congress deemed it unlawful to trade
derivative contracts.232
1. Previous Bans on Specific Derivative Contracts
As mentioned previously, Congress’ first attempt at
derivatives regulation occurred on June 17, 1864, when it passed
the Anti-Gold Futures Act.233 The Act made it unlawful to enter
into any futures contract for the purchase of gold coin, gold
bullion, or foreign exchange.234 The Act had the unintended
consequence of leading to the further decline in the value of the
Union’s “fiat currency,” and was repealed a mere two weeks after

7 U.S.C.S. § 1a(4) (LEXIS, through P.L. 111-237).
On April 22, 2010, the House Agriculture Subcommittee on General Farm
Commodities and Risk Management held a hearing on DBOR derivatives. See Press
Release, House Agric. Comm., Subcommittee Reviews Proposed “Movies Futures” Market
(Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/list/press/agriculture_dem/
PR042210GFCRM.html. However, the ban on DBOR contracts in the Financial Reform
Act was originally drafted by the Senate Agriculture and Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committees. The Financial Reform Act passed by the Senate on May 20,
2010 was required to be reconciled with the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2009, which was passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The original House
bill did not include a ban on DBOR derivatives, and the House Agriculture Subcommittee
hearing on this issue did not take place until after the bill was passed. House Agriculture
Committee Chairman, Collin C. Peterson, who did attend the House Agriculture
Subcommittee on DBOR contracts, as well as House Agriculture Subcommittee on
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management Chairman Leonard Boswell, were
members of the joint House-Senate conference committee in charge of reconciling the
Financial Reform Act. Reps. Peterson and Boswell, as far as this author can tell, were the
only individuals on the conference committee who attended the House Agriculture
Subcommittee hearing. See generally Hearing to Review Proposals to Establish Exchanges
Trading “Movie Futures”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Farm Commodities
and Risk Management of the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. (2010); House
Conferees Appointed on H.R. 4173, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/file/
key_issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/Conferees_List_Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2010).
231 See Harris, supra note 224.
232 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 721(a)(4).
233 Greenspan, Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 47.
234 Anti-Gold Futures Act, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 132, (1864).
229
230
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it was passed.235 It would be nearly a century before Congress
once again banned trading on a specific commodity future.236
When Congress passed the CEA in 1936, it imposed an
absolute ban on options for regulated commodities.237 Until the
CEA was amended by the CFTCA in 1974, there existed no
restrictions on the trading of options on unregulated
commodities.238 On September 21, 1981, however, the CFTC
adopted a comprehensive set of regulations to govern exchangetrading of options on futures contracts under a controlled and
monitored three-year pilot program, and on February 15, 1985,
the CFTC approved the first option on a physical commodity:
gold bullion.239
Commodity options, which are now fully
regulated by the CFTC, can be traded on DCMs if the exchange
meets the prior approval or self-certification requirements of the
CEA.240
Perhaps the most pervasive manipulation of the commodity
markets between the years of 1930 and 1970 took place in the
onion markets.241 As a result of the severe price swings in
onions, the CEA was amended in 1955 to give the Commodity
Exchange Authority power to regulate trading in onion
futures.242 In 1956, Congress gave consideration to prohibiting
trading in onion futures, with hearings being held before the
House Agriculture Committee, which concluded that there was a
causal relationship between trading onion futures and

235 Jenny Wahl, Give Lincoln Credit: How Paying for the Civil War Transformed the
United States Financial System, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 700, 725 n.109; Greenspan,
Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts, supra note 47.
236 David S. Jacks, Populists Versus Theorists: Future Markets and the Volatility of
Prices, 44 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 342, 353 (2007) (discussing the passage of the
Onion Futures Act in 1958).
237 Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, sec. 4c(3)(B), 49 Stat. 1491, 1494 (1936).
238 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
AGE OF DERIVATIVES TO THE MILLENNIUM (1970–2001) 44 (2002).
239 History
of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
240 Proposals to Establish Exchanges Trading “Movie Futures:” Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on General Farm Commodities & Risk Mgmt., House Comm. on Agric. 111th Cong.
6–7 (2010) (testimony of Dan M. Berkovitz, General Counsel, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/no42210/
Berkovitz.pdf.
241 See, e.g., Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 603 (1960) (highlighting that the
Commodity Exchange Authority alleged upward manipulation of spot market onion prices
and onion futures contracts for November and December of 1955 on the CME, and further
alleging downward manipulation of spot market onion prices and onion futures contracts
for January and February of 1956 on the CME); BOB TAMARKIN, THE NEW GATSBYS:
FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF COMMODITY TRADERS 29 (1985) (“Hardly a day passed, it
seemed, without somebody trying to corner the onion market or squeeze prices higher or
push them lower.”).
242 Act of Jul. 26. 1955, Pub. L. No. 174, 69 Stat. 375 (1955).
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fluctuations in the cash price of onions.243 The Committee
recommended that “futures trading be prohibited if the futures
market could not be operated so as to prevent injury to onion
producers.”244 The same recommendation was made by the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, which stated
that:
[B]ecause speculative activity in the futures market was apparently
adversely affecting cash onion prices, Congress added onions to the
commodities subject to regulation under the Commodity Exchange
Act . . . . This has not cured the situation . . . [and i]t now appears
that speculative activity in the futures markets causes such severe
and unwarranted fluctuations in the price of cash onions as to require
complete prohibition of onion futures trading in order to assure the
orderly flow of onions in interstate commerce.245

As a result of the Senate and House Committee
recommendations, on August 28, 1958, Congress passed the
Onion Futures Act, which banned trading of futures contracts on
onions.246 Until 2010, the passage of the Onion Futures Act was
the only time since the Anti-Gold Futures Act that Congress
imposed an outright ban on a specific commodity futures
contract.247 Although there had been previous attempts to ban
futures contracts on other commodity exchanges, these bills had
been ultimately unsuccessful due to lobbying by congressional
constituents with agricultural interests.248
Even though the subject underlying single security futures
contracts are not commodities, the most recent ban on a specific
derivative contract prior to the ban on DBOR derivative contracts
stemmed from the failure of the CFTC and SEC to agree on how
these instruments were to be regulated.249
The divergent
opinions of the two agencies led to the Shad-Johnson
Jurisdictional Accord, which banned trading of single security

243

1959).

See Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Tieken, 178 F. Supp. 779, 781–83 (N.D. Ill.

Id.
Id.
See 7 U.S.C. § 13-1(a) (1958).
Jacks, supra note 236.
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 329 n.165 (1997) (discussing the lobbying efforts of
onion and potato farmers in the 1950s). See also William H. Jones, Church Introduces
Plan to Ban Trading of All Potato Futures, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1977, at D11 (quoting
Senator Frank Church as saying, “[t]ime and time again, potato producers from across the
nation have indicated that they have no desire to have trading in futures. They are tired
of being the innocent victims of economic power plays by . . . spectators”); History of the
CFTC, supra note 239 (noting that on July 21, 1964, Sen. Edmund Muskie introduced a
bill to ban potato futures, but the bill did not become law).
249 CFTC AND SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL
ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5.
244
245
246
247
248
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futures contracts for nearly twenty years.250 This ban was
eventually lifted, though, when Congress passed the CFMA, and
today single security futures are jointly regulated by the CFTC
and SEC.251
Despite attempts over the years to ban specific commodity
derivative contracts, the only current commodities on which it is
unlawful to trade derivatives are onions and DBORs.252 While
there has been little support to allow trading of onion futures
over the last half-century, the ban on DBOR derivatives merely
stems from poor timing.
III. THE CASE FOR DBOR DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS
It is not entirely clear what Congress’ intent was behind
specifically banning DBOR derivative contracts in the Financial
Reform Act. One can assume, however, that after the sub-prime
mortgage crisis and the financial sector fallout in 2008, investors
and elected officials became extremely wary about the use of
derivatives. As the historical portion of this Article details,
however, derivatives have been traded in the United States since
1849.253
While these instruments were originally used as
hedging devices for individuals and organizations involved in the
agricultural sector, in the 1970s, derivatives began to be used by
financial institutions, and the character of these devices
expanded.254
250 Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409, 1409–10
(1982) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)(II–III) (1994)). See also 7 U.S.C. § 2(C)(i–ii)(I–III)
(2006) (“the Commission shall have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as a
contract market for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction acquires any
put, call, or other option on one or more securities (as defined in section 77b(1) of title 15
or section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)] on
January 11, 1983), including any group or index of such securities, or any interest therein
or based on the value thereof”);; Sanford A. Fine, Back To the (Single Stock) Future: The
New Regulatory Framework Governing Single-Stock Futures Trading, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
513, 515 n.8 (2002) (noting that 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)(II–III) (1994) codifies “a portion of the
Shad-Johnson Accord concerning the prohibition on trading futures on an individual
security or in a narrow-based index”);; CFTC & SEC—ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHADJOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD, supra note 81, at 5–6 (“These three CEA amendments
led to a dispute between SEC and CFTC that was eventually resolved through the ShadJohnson Jurisdictional Accord. . . . [T]he accord prohibited futures (and options thereon)
on single corporate and municipal securities.”).
251 Dean Kloner, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 29 SEC. REG.
L.J. 286, 293 (2001).
252 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1659, § 721(a)(4) (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a).
253 Gary
Gensler,
History
of
Derivative
Regulation,
Culprit
OTCs,
COMMODITYONLINE, (July 2, 2010, 3:35 PM), http://www.commodityonline.com/news/
History-of-derivatives-regulation-culprit-OTCs-29636-3-1.html; Dodd, supra note 156,
at 1.
254 See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 822 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 12th ed. 2008); FINANCIAL CRISIS
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Many people analogize the trading of derivatives to
gambling.255 This suggestion could not be further from the truth,
however. As Nobel prize winning economist Vernon L. Smith
stated, “[g]ambling involves the deliberate creation of artificial
zero-sum opportunities to engage in risk taking decisions that
redistribute existing resources.”256 Professor Smith continued,
“[DBOR derivative contracts] are in the class of variable-sum
stock and derivatives’ markets in which information on the
future outcome of productive and technological activities is
dispersed, uncertain, and rendered valuable to society when
aggregated into prices [such as agricultural commodities].”257
While some may find it difficult to understand what a DBOR
futures contract has in common with a wheat futures contract,
the fact remains that both of these instruments provide
individuals with opportunities to hedge their financial risk.258
INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT OVERVIEW ON DERIVATIVES 3 (2010),
available at http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf; Rob
Kirby, Understanding Derivatives to Understand the Credit Crisis, MARKET ORACLE
(Oct. 20, 2008, 5:23 PM), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6890.html; Thomas F.
Siems, 10 Myths About Financial Derivatives, CATO INSTITUTE, (Sept. 11, 1997),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-283.html.
255 Shahien Nasiripour, Derivatives Just “A Sophisticated Form Of Gambling,” U.S.
Senators Say; Propose Bill Allowing State Gambling Laws To Apply, HUFFINGTON POST
(last updated Nov. 10, 2009, 11:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/10/
derivatives-just-a-sophis_n_352994.html (“In describing the complex and little-understood
world of derivatives trading as ‘a sophisticated form of gambling,’ three U.S. Senators
proposed legislation that would enable state gambling regulators and attorneys general to
examine the practice.”);; Jane D'Arista & Gerald Epstein, Congress Should Force Big
Banks to Stop Gambling With Our Money, ALTERNET (May 10, 2010),
http://www.alternet.org/economy/146806/congress_should_force_big_banks_to_stop_gambl
ing_with_our_money/ (“The derivatives business is straight gambling.”).
256 Public Comment of Vernon L. Smith in Response to Concept Release on the
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts (May 7, 2008), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/frcomment/08004c001.pdf.
257 Id.
258 For a discussion on the benefits of wheat futures contracts, see Mark B. Major &
Alan May, MontGuide: The Futures Hedge (Short Hedge), MONT. STATE UNIV. (Dec. 2009),
http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT200919AG.pdf (noting
that a wheat futures (short) hedge can be beneficial because, “[b]y locking in the futures
price on the futures market, downside price risk is eliminated”);; Mykel Taylor et al.,
Hedging v. Forward Contracting for Wheat, AGMANAGER.INFO (September 2003),
http://www.agmanager.info/marketing/publications/marketing/forwardcontracting.asp
(“When the cash price at harvest is higher than the expected price (i.e., price increases),
the loss in the [wheat] futures market reduces the actual price received. When the price
at harvest is lower than the expected price (i.e., price decreases), the gain in the [wheat]
futures market offsets the loss in the cash market and thus increases the actual price
received. It is this variation in price from which the producer is protected by hedging in
the futures market.”). For a discussion on the benefits of DBOR futures contracts, see Dr.
Kris, Movie Futures Face Big Questions, SEEKING ALPHA, (March 8, 2010),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/192390-movie-futures-face-big-questions (“[A] company’s
movie futures will create liquidity and provide studios with a hedging mechanism besides
making the little guy an active participant.”); Ryan Pertz, Fast Forward: Distributing
Film Risk, NEWBIZVIEWS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.newbizviews.com/2010/04/28/fast-
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Film companies, like any other commercial entity (e.g., a
farmer) must sell what they produce at a profit in order to
continue to exist as a viable business.
Film companies
specifically are in the business of selling successful films.259
Unfortunately, if film companies fail to produce enough
successful films, they will not be long for the industry.260 To put
it in economic terms, a film company has an incentive to produce
quality films. Because film companies have this incentive, one
could certainly envision a situation where such an entity would
take a long position in a film futures contract. If a film company
truly believed in their film, there would be no reason not to take
such a position, because they would, in essence, have the
opportunity to “double down”261 on their product. Not only would
the film company generate revenue from the initial sale of the
movie, but if the movie generated enough box office receipts, the
film company would earn even more money when it collected on
its long positions.
On the flip side, film financiers, distributors, and theaters
generate their revenue from box office receipts.262 Thus, in order
for these individuals and companies to remain viable, enough
revenue must be generated at the box office to at least break
even. Because there is always the risk that a film will “flop,”
these individuals and companies would enter into a short
position to hedge against this risk. If a film failed to produce

forward-distributing-film-risk/ (“Like commodity forwards, movie futures can serve a
practical purpose: they could enable the primary risk bearers (movie financiers in this
case) to distribute a portion of their risk.”).
259 See Shannon McCoy, The Government Tunes in to Tune Out the Marketing of
Violent Entertainment to Kids: The Media Violence Labeling Act, The Media Marketing
Accountability Act and the First Amendment, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 237, 245 (2002)
(“Film studios promote and advertise films to make money, not merely to express
themselves artistically.”).
260 See Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26.
261 This author is fully aware that he is using a gambling phrase in an article that
tries to dispel the myth that derivatives are nothing more than a form of gambling.
262 Aljean Harmetz, Where Movie Ticket Income Goes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1987),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/28/movies/where-movie-ticket-incomegoes.html (“The distributor of a movie—the studio that releases a film to theaters—
usually ends up with less than fifty percent of the money paid for tickets.”);; Mark Litwak,
Protecting
Film
Investors,
MARK
LITWAK’S
ENTM’T
LAW
RESOURCES,
http://www.marklitwak.com/articles/general/protecting_film_investors.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2010) (“[A]n intelligent investment in a motion picture can earn substantial
returns. While film investments are risky, the potential return from a hit can be
enormous. No [sic] only can the film earn revenue from box office receipts, but there are
many ancillary sources of income.”);; Sarah Morgan, 10 Things Movie Theaters Won’t Tell
You, YAHOO! FINANCE (Dec. 31, 2009), http://finance.yahoo.com/family-home/article/
108494/things-theaters-wont-tell-you?mod=family-kids_parents (“[G]enerally speaking,
theaters pay somewhere between 35 and 70 percent of box office receipts to the studio as a
film-rental fee . . . . In most cases, the studio takes the biggest cut in the first week, and
the percentage drops from there.”).
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enough revenue at the box office to equal these entities’
investments, the settlement on their DBOR contracts would, in
theory, provide the capital necessary to allow the entities to
break even.
If the long and short positions of these individuals and
organizations are in balance, enough liquidity would be available
in these markets to encourage others (e.g., marketing partners,
minor investors, film talent, speculators) to buy and sell these
same contracts. A DBOR market, which would clearly provide
information about the expected success or failure of a film, would
allow commercial and speculative investors to rebalance their
particular positions as needed.
Movie studios may argue that no incentive exists for them to
short a movie because filmmakers would decide never to work
with that studio again; the theory being that if a studio does not
believe a film will produce sufficient box office revenue, it must
not believe in the quality of a filmmaker’s work. This, of course,
is the basis for the natural long position of the studios. However,
as stated earlier, only about one-in-three films are expected to
have the potential to come close to breaking even.263 Thus, even
if a studio did short its own film because it did not believe
sufficient box office revenue would be generated, filmmakers
would never know about this position because DCMs and the
CFTC are kept anonymous.264
As the CFTC observed in its order approving MDEX’s DBOR
contract, DBOR numbers—the majority of which are prepared
automatically by Rentrak—are not subject to manipulation.265
The small percentage of call-around data,266 even if it were
attempted to be manipulated by the theaters or studios, would
have a de minimis effect on the settlement data for these futures

Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26.
7 U.S.C.A § 6g(b) (West 2009) (“Every registered entity shall maintain daily
trading records. The daily trading records shall include such information as the
Commission shall prescribe by rule.”);; § 12(a)(1) (stating that, “except as otherwise
specifically authorized in this chapter, the Commission may not publish data and
information that would separately disclose the business transactions or market positions
of any person and trade secrets or names of customers”).
265 Statement of the Commission, supra note 185, at 5–6.
266 See Richard Shilts, Director, Division of Market Oversight on Meeting of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Discuss: Futures and Binary Options Based
on Box Office Receipts, (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/shiltstatement051910.html (“A small amount of box office receipts are
not reported through Rentrak; they are reported directly from those theatres to the
distributor. This data is referred to as call-around data. Once the distributor sums the
Rentrak and call-around receipt data, that number is reported back to Rentrak which in
turn distributes it to Variety Magazine, BoxOfficeMojo.com, and other news organizations
and interested parties.”).
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contracts.267 Assuming arguendo that Rentrak’s numbers could
potentially be manipulated, there would be no incentive for
Rentrak to do so because it has no direct interest in DBOR
numbers.268 The fact that DBOR settlement prices are linked to
a third party index is no different from agricultural commodity
derivative contracts (e.g., feeder cattle futures which are linked
to USDA indices).269 The reputation of Rentrak, like the USDA,
is important, however. Rentrak numbers have been a marketing
tool that film studios have used for more than twenty years.270 It
is highly unlikely that Rentrak would start falsifying DBOR
numbers now. The price basis for DBOR contract settlement,
therefore, is not in question, and Congress, like the CFTC, should
not be concerned about the potential for inaccurate settlement of
these contracts.
Perhaps the greatest reason for allowing DBOR derivatives
trading is the potential increase in capital that would flow into
the film industry. As noted earlier, film financing has begun to
dry up over the past few decades.271 This is directly correlated to
the risk associated with financing a film.272 If investors could be
assured that they would be able to hedge this risk, they would
certainly be more likely to invest in the film industry.273
Additionally, by increasing the amount of capital available to the
film industry, the number of motion pictures exported from the
U.S. would increase.274
The potential for increased film
financing, along with the ability for individuals and
organizations whose revenue streams are directly tied to DBORs,
is reason enough for Congress to repeal the ban on DBOR
derivatives and allow trading of these contracts.
CONCLUSION
Whether DBOR derivative contracts fail due to lack of
interest should be left to the exchange participants to decide, not
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id. at 6–7.
See About Rentrak, RENTRAK CORP., http://www.rentrak.com/section/corporate/
about/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
271 Moore, Raising Film Financing, supra note 143, at 4.
272 Id.
273 Moore, Financing Drama, supra note 144, at 26.
274 See, e.g., NAT’L EXPORT INITIATIVE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL
EXPORT INITIATIVE: THE EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET’S PLAN FOR DOUBLING U.S.
EXPORTS IN FIVE YEARS 40 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/nei_report_9-16-10_full.pdf (outlining recommendations for doubling U.S. exports
over the next five years). Given the emphasis on increasing U.S. exports, it seems curious
to this author that legislation potentially limiting the number of exports—which is what
could potentially occur to feature films by banning box office derivatives—would be
enacted.
267
268
269
270
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Congress. DBORs, along with onions, are the only commodities
on which derivatives trading is currently unlawful. When onion
futures were banned in 1958, however, it was the result of a
three year long process that included hearings before multiple
congressional committees.275 DBOR contracts, however, had the
simple misfortune of poor timing. Were it not for the sub-prime
mortgage crisis and the resulting economic fallout, it is unlikely
that Congress would have given the CFTC’s decision to allow
trading of DBOR derivatives a second thought. Nonetheless,
Congress—who clearly arrived late to the table—decided that
simply because DBOR derivatives are similar to the CDSs that
helped lead to the economic collapse in 2008, they deserved to be
banned. This is undoubtedly the wrong approach to take.
Unfortunately, the ban on DBOR derivatives may be a sign of
things to come. In an environment where the vast majority of
new derivative exchanges and contracts are highly regulated by
the CFTC and SEC, congressional stifling of financial innovation
is both unnecessary and potentially harmful to a financial
industry that could lose future markets to international
competitors.

275 See 90 Years of Blood, Sweat and Onions, ONION WORLD, (July/Aug. 2003),
http://www.columbiapublications.com/onionworld/julyaug2003.htm#ow29 (“In the 1950s
those of the onion industry contended with futures trading on the Chicago Merchantile
Exchange . . . . In the December 1955 [National Onion Association] annual meeting, a
resolution was passed to eliminate futures trading . . . . The [National Onion Association]
was the vehicle that moved the U.S. Congress to pass law that would ban futures
trading . . . . Seven bills were presented to Congress to have it discontinued, countless
letters were written in opposition and members of the industry traveled to Washington,
D.C., to appear before congressional committees. Futures trading was officially banned in
1958.”);; History of the CFTC, supra note 239 (noting that following a complaint regarding
the manipulation of onion futures in 1956, “Congress held hearings to consider banning
onion futures trading . . . . [In 1958 t]he Onion Futures Act ban[ned] futures trading in
onions”).

